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The Real Huawei Story and the 5G Era
Abstract
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd, a Chinese telecommunication technology company and the second largest
telecommunication equipment company in the world by revenue, is about to become the largest and the
leader in the newest 5G telecommunications era (Sin 2017). For the past year of 2018, Huawei has been
reported widely in the media for the detainment of its CFO Meng Wanzhou, who is being suspected of
stealing technology from United States companies and illegally trading devices to Iran. However, Huawei's
true story of development remains unheard among the controversies and conspiracy theories around
Meng's detainment. This article will not expand on those controversies but will use this opportunity to
unveil Huawei's incredible path of growth, from being a marginal player to becoming one of today's
frontier companies in the telecommunications industry, as well as how Huawei will impact the industry's
future with its 5G technology.
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The Real Huawei Story and the 5G Era
Chevy Luo
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd, a Chinese teleǦ
communication technology company and the secǦ
ond largest telecommunication equipment company
ǡ Ǧ
est and the leader in the newest 5G telecommunicaǦ
ȋʹͲͳȌǤ ʹͲͳͺǡ Ǧ
         
 ǡ
suspected of stealing technology from United States
companies and illegally trading devices to Iran. HowǦ
ever, Huawei’s true story of development remains
unheard among the controversies and conspiracy
theories around Meng’s detainment. This article will
 
   ǯ    
ǡ        
one of today’s frontier companies in the telecommuǦ
nications industry, as well as how Huawei will imǦ
pact the industry’s future with its 5G technology.

and trading the domestic market share for technolǦ
ogy, China allowed international telecommunication
ϐϐ
infrastructures. Companies like Alcatel, Ericsson,
ǡ ǡ    ǯ Ǧ
  ȋ ȌǤ  
competition of advanced technologies, unlike other
  ϐ 
on importing foreign technology, Huawei decided
to develop a more complicated switch system on its
Ǥ  ǡ Ǧ
come one of Huawei’s core strategies (Ahrens 2013).
ͳͻͻ͵ǡ  ϐǦ
ƬͲͺǦ  Ǧ
tract directly from the PLA. In the early 90s, due to
the gaps in technology, the domestic market of China
 Ǥ 
government was a typical Chinese way of securing
a foothold in the domestic market for the Chinese
ϐǤϐ  
    Ƭ   
     Ǥ
Other than developing its own technology, Huawei
also targeted its sales on Chinese rural areas where
most IJV ignored. Ren Zhengfei quoted Mao Zedong
 ǲ
   ǳǤ  ͳͻͻǡ ǯ Ǧ
mestic market share of switch system had increased
to 20%, standing right next to the IJV Shanghai Bell.
        
ͳͻͻͷǡ Ƭ 
in Shanghai. This move indicated Huawei’s success

I. WINNING THE CHINESE MARKET
(1987-1996)
Ren Zhengfei, the founder and the current CEO
 ǡǯǦ
ȋȌ
Corporation in 1983. At the end of 1987, Ren started
   Ǥǡ     Ǧ
ϐ ǣ   
technology (Ahrens 2013). In the 1990s, under ReǦ
ǦǦǦǡ      Ǧ
 ǯ      
policies, including encouraging foreign investments
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 ϐ   
market. Also, Huawei’s success in the domestic marǦ
ket provided an example of a growth model for other
ϐȋʹͲͳ͵ȌǤ

 ǡǡ
 Ǥ ʹͲͲ͵ʹͲͲͷǡ Ǧ
 ̈́ʹͲ
ǡ̈́ʹͲͲ Ǧ
  ȋʹͲͲȌǤ
ʹͲͲͳ    ϐ    ǯ
marketing efforts in developed countries. As a newǦ
    ǡ  ǡ 
Ǧ 
 Ǥ       Ǧ
ented and especially paid attention to quality stanǦ
Ǥ ʹͲͲͳǡ ϐ Ǧ
 
station that complied with multiple communication
standards. Huawei designed this station after noǦ
         

ȋ Ƭ ȌǤ   ϐ  ǯ
Ǧϐ Ǥ ǡ   ϐ 
 ϐ   ϐ   
in targeting customers’ demands and executing its
Ǥ  ǡ  ʹͲͲʹǡ   ϐ 
overtaken the most dominant IJV Shanghai Bell and
 ͳʹΨ Ǧ
nications. By the end of 2005, Huawei had had even
  Ǧ
Ǥ ǡǡ 
credited to low prices and good customer service
ȋ ʹͲͲȌǤ

II. EXPANDING TO INTERNATIONAL
MARKETS: COMPETITIVE PRICING AND
CUSTOMER-ORIENTED ATTITUDE (1996-2006)
         
market, Huawei started to put its eyes on internaǦ
tional markets. However, expanding to international
 Ǧ
 ϐ    ͻͲ     
  Ǧ    
     ϐ Ǥ  Ǧ
  ϐ ǡ    
    ǲǦǳ    
ǲǳ  Ǧ
petitors (Ahrens 2013). Ren Zhengfei provided exǦ
    
ǡ     ǲ Ǧϐǳ
 Ǥ 
for cheaper prices, accordingly, Huawei offered very
low prices with nearly 30% off from its original sale
 Ǧ  
rapport for the long run. This has helped Huawei
       
ȋ ʹͲͲȌǤ
 ϐ ϐ   ǯ 
     ̈́ͳʹǡͲͲͲ   
  Ǧ
services, Huawei was eventually rewarded. By 2001,
Huawei’s sales of its switch system in Russia had inǦ
̈́ͳͲͲȋ ʹͲͲȌǤ 
ǡǦ
ȋȌǡ 
   Ǥ    Ǧ
ǯ ǡ 

III. FROM “MADE IN CHINA” TO “INNOVATED
IN CHINA” (2006-2016)
Ren Zhengfei knew that simply offering low pricǦ
 ǡ 
       Ǥ
While providing its products to meet customers’
ǡ      
up with new technological trends. According to the
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ǯ ǡʹͲͲ͵ʹͲͲǡ 
Ǧ
  ǣ

Figure 2: Sales Growth of Huawei (rightmost)
and other top international players in
2007-2011

2006, June: Huawei launched the world’s fastest
   Ǧ 
Access USB Modem, the E220, in Singapore.

ϐ  ʹͲͲʹͲͳͲ
hurt Huawei’s sales growth, the company still mainǦ
    Ƭ   
  ǣ

2003, July:     Ǧ
partment
2004, February: ǯϐ
 
͵  ǡ  
2005, June: ǯϐ͵ ǡ
ʹǡǮ͵ ǯ
the Charlton Media Group

     Ǥ 
 ǡ      Ǧ
nology in its own house at its core after receiving
ϐ        
outperformed Shanghai Bell in the 90s. Huawei
stayed with this strategy even during the economic
 ǡ   ǣ

2007:   
Ǧ ǡ 
ʹͲǡ  
Design Award for the E172
2008, November: Huawei E180 was named the
ǲ ǳ

2009, February: ϐǦ
droid smartphone and announced its cooperǦ
ǦǦ
gress in Spain
2010, August: Total shipments of Huawei’s moǦ
  ͳͲͲ
units
2010, September:  ϐ
ǲ ǳ ǯʹǤʹ
    Ǥ
2011, August:  Ǧ
 ǡ ǯϐ ǦǦ
ǡ ȋ ȌǤ

Figure 1: R&D Spending of Huawei (rightmost)
and other top international players in
2006-2011

ǡϐǦ
cial crisis from 2007 to 2010, Huawei’s sales growth
remained positive and moved closer to those of the
  Ǥ     
 ǣ

Along with the technological leaps, Huawei also
innovated its own style of management which is
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  ǲ   ǳǤ  Ǧ
er technology companies, Huawei does not issue
common stocks. Instead, the shareholders of HuaǦ
wei are Ren Zhengfei and his employees. Based on
internal documents from Huawei, Ren Zhengfei
owns 1.4% of the total shares and the 82,471 emǦ
    ͻͺǤΨ ȋ   
 Ǥ ʹͲͳͶȌǤ  ǡ     Ǧ
rectly from company’s growth and thus were motiǦ
Ǥǡ 
  Ǧ
 
shareholders, which is commonly seen in companies
issuing common stocks. Here, Huawei again sets anǦ
other example for a model for management. While
  Ǧ
        ϐ ǡ
ǡ   ǡ      Ǧ
sources and human power to accomplish its goals.
ǡ
its positive sales growth and research and developǦ
ϐ  ʹͲͳͲǤ

ʹͲͳ 
 Ǥ Ƭ Ǧ
ȋʹͲͳȌǤǡ 
total of 74,307 patents and 48,758 of them were auǦ
Ǥ 
third next to Samsung Electronics Co Ltd and IBM
Corp in 2017 (Huawei Technology Inc. 2017). Those
accomplishments indicated Huawei’s transformaǦ
  ǲ  ǳ  ǲ  ǳǤ
ϐ
ǡ  Ǥ

IV. EMBRACING THE FUTURE: 5G NETWORK
(2017- Present)
ǡ          ǡ 
       
 
companies like Apple, Samsung and Huawei. Some
may argue that every successful company is marked
 Ǥ ǡǡ
      ϐ   
the newest generation of data communication and
technology designs. The newer one emerges as a
 ǣ  Ǧ
   Ǥ
   
 Ǧ
ous leader as of now, the one who offers the solution
for the next generation’s telecommunication needs
Ǥ 
is the upcoming 5G era. As IEEE Spectrum ǡ
compared to our 4G, 5G telecommunications has
 ǣ
A. Millimeter Wave. Millimeter waves use highǦ
er frequencies than the radio waves commonly used
Ǥ  Ǧ
ǯ  Ǥ
B. Small CellsǤ 

Figure 3: Huawei’s R&D Spending (2012-2016)

     ϐ    ʹͲͳͲ 
  ϐ     
industry, then Huawei was one of the unicorns that
 Ǥ
ϐ͵ǡʹͲͳǡ ǯƬ
spending had reached a historical peak with equivaǦ
ͳͳǡͷǤͻǤϐ 
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        ʹͷͲ 
or so throughout cities. Thousands of these stations
can prevent signaling from failing.
C. Massive MIMO.     ǦǦ
  Ǥ ͷ     
and receive signals from many more users at once,
    Ǧ
tor of 22 or greater.
D. Beam Forming. It reduces communication inǦ
 ǤǦ
ation and the technology, there are several ways for
5G networks to implement it.
E. Full Duplex. ͷ ǡ 
  ϐ  Ǥ
ϐͷ 
Ǥ ǡ 
      
race. So, where is Huawei’s position now? How far
can it go? The two charts in the Appendix show that
͵ͳ 
prepared Huawei for the next 5G era, with its techniǦ
 ͷ   
 Ǥ 
  ǡ       
future.

to the limited length of the article, only a few salient
 ǯ 
Ǥǡ
ϐ  ǯ    
as the most important assets and putting technologǦ
 ϐ Ǥ
Other than the uniqueness of its culture, Huawei
 Ǧ
 ǣ
 
Ǥ 
ǡ Ǧ
dure the loss of certain portions of sales and get alǦ
Ǥ

V. CONCLUSION
This article has not covered all of Huawei’s stoǦ
ries. Their accomplishments speak louder than
Ǥ ͵ͳ    ǯ   
  Ǧ
 ǣ
Ǣ
to innovating.
Based on Huawei’s transformation, we can see a
unique culture of the company as a technology venǦ
    Ǧ ǡ  ǡ 
ǦǦ     Ǥ 
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APPENDIX
Figure 1
4:

Figure 2
5:

Sources: Statista
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